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Northern Ireland has moved from a conflict
society to one where there is a devolved power-
sharing legislative Assembly and the absence of
large-scale violence. There are, of course,
ongoing challenges to the political institutions
but as the governmental structures settle into
place, politicians are seeking new ways of
addressing systemic social and economic
problems. Issues which need to be tackled
include multi-generational poverty, high levels
of unemployment, public sector dependency,
and lack of basic skills, particularly among
young people. There are also sporadic
community tensions associated with legacy
issues of the conflict such as flags, parades and
dealing with the past.
One of the key features of the political
settlement emerging from the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement 1998 and the St Andrew’s
Agreement 2006 was the establishment of a
power-sharing executive, rooted in
consociational theory, between the five largest
political parties (Lijphart, 1968; 1975).
‘Consociation’ is a system where ‘political power
is shared by rival cultures on a proportional
basis—in the Northern Ireland Executive, the
legislature and public employment. Each
cultural community enjoys rights of veto and
autonomy’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, p.
509). The outworking of the consociational
model in Northern Ireland led to an increase
in the number of government departments
from six to 12 to ensure that pro-Agreement
parties obtained ministerial office, rather than
for reasons of administrative efficiency. While
this model promotes the inclusion of various
political views in the structures, one
consequence has been a diffusion of power
across different parts of government. This paper
attempts to do three things. First, it describes
the complexity of the devolved administration
in Northern Ireland, accentuated by the power-
sharing arrangements which are in place.
Second, it provides an example of the
limitations, so far, of tackling cross-
departmental ‘wicked’ issues. Third, it presents
an alternative approach in which the Northern
Ireland Executive is attempting to hard-wire
political and managerial inputs into a new
initiative entitled Delivering Social Change
(DSC) aimed at delivering integrated public
services.
Background
The fragmentation of government is not unique
to Northern Ireland and has been the subject
of scholarly research for some time (Challis et
al., 1988; Peters, 1998; Clark, 2002; James,
2002; Pollitt, 2003; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002;
6, 2002; 2004; Bogdanor, 2005). Exworthy and
Hunter (2011, p. 202), for example, trace the
origins of ways to address fragmentation in the
UK back to 1975 in an initiative entitled a Joint
Approach to Social Policy (CPRS, 1975), which
recognized ‘complex, wicked issues that
transcended organizational and departmental
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boundaries at all levels of government’. Wicked
issues, or seemingly intractable problems,
according to Clarke and Stewart (1997), cannot
be tackled by an individual organization or
agency, even if it has direct responsibility, but
require a capacity to work across organizational
boundaries. In an assessment of these early
attempts to develop more co-ordinated ways of
addressing wicked issues, Challis et al., 1988
concluded that the Joint Approach to Social Policy
(JASP) was ‘too rational and apolitical’. JASP was
seen variously by many ministers as: ‘an
unwelcome intrusion into their fiefdoms which
ultimately faltered and petered out and became
a victim of ‘ministerial indifference and
departmental obstruction’’ (Webb, 1998; and
Challis et al., 1998; cited in Exworthy and Hunter,
2011, p. 203)
The election of the New Labour government
in 1997 and its promise of major public sector
reform heralded the call for ‘joined-up
government’. Ling (2002, p. 616) defined joined-
up government in Britain as ‘a group of responses
to the perception that services had become
fragmented and that this fragmentation was
preventing the achievement of important goals
of public policy’. Several modernizing initiatives
ensued under the Labour government aimed at
achieving joined-up government, the most
prominent of which were Modernising Government
(Cabinet Office, 1999) and the Performance and
Innovation Unit Report entitled Wiring It Up
(Cabinet Office, 2000). These reports encouraged
new ways of working across organizations: pooled
budgets, joint action teams, shared objectives
and outcome targets, combined leadership, and
joint public consultation processes. The
modernizing agenda in Great Britain coincided
with devolution in Northern Ireland (1999),
which suffered a series of setbacks and suspensions
before stable devolved government was finally
established in 2007. As a result, Northern Ireland
sat at the margins of a British reform agenda and
made limited progress in the reform of public
services. Typical of this was the policy document
on The UK Government’s Approach to Public Sector
Reform (Cabinet Office, 2006). Despite the
reference to the ‘UK’ in the title, there was no
mention of the Northern Ireland Civil Service
(NICS) or the different circumstances which
prevailed. One NI-specific example entitled Fit
for Purpose: The Reform Agenda in the Northern
Ireland Civil Service (NICS, 2004) committed
officials to taking forward reforms containing
three key elements: prioritization of front-line
services; building capability within the NICS;
and, embracing diversity through external
recruitment and exchange.
As devolved government has stabilized in
Northern Ireland, attention to improving public
services has increased. These two issues
(devolution and public sector reform) are
inextricably linked not least because the
consociational model of devolved government
has accentuated the potential for fragmentation
in public services, an issue which is exacerbated
by societal divisions. The characterizing features
of devolved government in Northern Ireland
which have resulted in a disjointed approach
include:
•There is a large number of government
departments (12) for a relatively small
population (1.8 million). Attempts to reform
the machinery of government began in 2002
under the Review of Public Administration
(RPA). Government departments were left
out of the process because of the fragility of
devolved institutions at that time. Including
government departments and their associated
ministers could have been used as a way of
renegotiating the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreement ‘by the back door’ (Knox, 2012, p.
120). NI has very weak local government with
limited functional responsibilities, although
some additional services will follow the
reorganization of councils this year.
•There is a large number of non-departmental
public bodies for functions normally under
the control of local government in GB
(housing, education, social services). Birrell
(2008) points out that the expected cull of
quangos signalled in the RPA has led to a
transformation into ‘super-quangos’ in
education, health, social services and libraries.
•The five-party mandatory coalition which
constitutes the Northern Ireland Executive
has no formal opposition and ministers
carefully protect their political portfolios.
Legally (under the Northern Ireland Act 1998)
ministers must participate with Executive
colleagues in the preparation of a Programme
for Government (PfG) and operate within the
framework of that programme. Under the
ministerial code, where any matter cuts across
the responsibilities of two or more ministers;
requires the adoption of a common position;
is significant or controversial and outside the
scope of the agreed PfG; then the minister
*Parallel consent: a majority of those MLAs present
and voting, including a majority of the unionist and
nationalist designations present and voting.
**Weighted majority: 60% of MLAs present and
voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist
and unionist designations present and voting.
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needs to bring it to the attention of the
Executive. In practice, ministers have been
accused of doing ‘solo runs’. The most recent
examples of these include: the SDLP
environment minister taking unilateral action
not to progress a major planning bill to
legislation; the Sinn Féin education minister’s
proposed reforms of the funding
arrangements in schools; and the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) health minister’s stance
on gay blood donations and adoption by gay
and lesbian couples. As one local newspaper
put it: ‘the Executive isn’t behaving as a
partnership, power-sharing government
should—ministers are operating in a political
cocoon. Stormont is not a collegiate business’
(Curran, 2013, p. 2).
•The nature of the consocational model gives
veto rights to the minority. Certain Assembly
decisions require cross-community support
either through parallel consent* or a weighted
majority**. Aughey (2012, pp. 155–154)
describes the Executive as ‘enforced coalition’
which means ‘that parties are involved in
stopping their ethnic rivals getting what they
want rather than considering what is best for
Northern Ireland as a whole’. There is
therefore a lack of collective responsibility and
‘an absence of an overarching allegiance to
the shared polity which can counteract
sectarian instincts’.
These features of devolved government in
Northern Ireland build-in the potential for
greater fragmentation in the implementation of
public policies agreed in the Programme for
Government. Importantly, given the historic
voting patterns of the electorate, there is not a
direct line of accountability between ministerial
performance and how he/she polls in elections.
In fact, public reaction to the performance of
the devolved government is underwhelming as
judged by participants in the Northern Ireland
Life and Times Survey (see figure 1). The 2012
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey involved
1,204 face-to-face interviews with adults aged 18
years or over. The main stage of the fieldwork
was carried out between 1 October 2012 and 10
January 2013. The sample for the 2012 survey
consisted of a systematic random sample of
addresses selected from the Postcode Address
File (PAF) database of addresses. This is the most
up-to-date and complete listing of addresses.
Private business addresses were removed from
the database prior to sample selection. Since
2007, following previous on-off devolution, there
has been a modest increase in the percentage of
respondents who feel the Assembly has achieved
‘a little’ (53% in 2012); an upward trend in those
who feel ‘nothing’ has been achieved (21% in
2012) and a low percentage of respondents who
feel the Assembly has achieved ‘a lot’ (14% in
2012).
Tackling wicked problems: neighbourhood
renewal
Urban policy in England was one of the areas
which attracted significant potential for integrated
public services. The Social Exclusion Unit, for
example, highlighted the huge needs of people
living in areas suffering from multiple deprivation
which could only be addressed by a range of
public bodies and agencies, illustrated in the
report Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy
for Neighbourhood Renewal (Cabinet Office, 1998).
The equivalent approach was adopted in
Northern Ireland in 2003 when the government
launched a policy document entitled People and
Place: A Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. This
long term (10+ years) strategy targeted those
communities experiencing the highest levels of
deprivation. Neighbourhood renewal is a cross
government strategy, led by the Department for
Social Development (DSD), aiming to bring
together the work of all government departments
in partnership with local people to tackle
disadvantage and deprivation in all aspects of
everyday life. The purpose of the
Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (DSD,
2003) was therefore to reduce the social and
economic inequalities which characterize the
most deprived areas. It does so by making a
long-term commitment to communities to work
in partnership with them, identify and prioritize
Figure 1. What has the Northern Ireland Assembly achieved?
Submit as a PDF good enough for camera ready reporodyction. No
caption. Or, better, a table.
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needs, and co-ordinate interventions designed
to address the underlying causes of poverty.
Resources were targeted using the following
selection process. Neighbourhoods in the most
deprived 10% of electoral wards across Northern
Ireland were identified using a multiple
deprivation index and designated
neighbourhood renewal areas (NRAs). Following
extensive consultation, this resulted in a total of
36 areas, and a population of approximately
280,000 (one person in six), being targeted for
intervention. The areas included 15 in Belfast;
six in the north west (including four in the city of
Derry/Londonderry) and 15 in other towns and
cities across Northern Ireland.
In the seven-year period (2003–2010) some
£140 million was spent on the neighbourhood
renewal programme to improve social, economic
and physical conditions. In addition, £77.5 million
was spent in 2008–2011 on urban regeneration
projects including the transformation of the city
centre of Derry/Londonderry, the new peace
bridge over the river Foyle, the Belfast Streets
Ahead project (implemented to transform Belfast
city centre) and major public realm improvements
(Northern Ireland Executive, 2011, p. 17). From
2011 onwards, there is a £20 million recurrent
and £6–£8 million capital funding yearly resource
commitment for a four-year period.
The DSD, the lead department in
government, which co-ordinated neighbourhood
renewal completed an internal mid-term review
of its People and Place Strategy that monitored
progress up until 2008/09—effectively an interim
evaluation of the policy to that point (DSD,
2011). The evaluation noted that the main aim of
the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme was
to reduce the gap between the most deprived
neighbourhood and the rest of the country and
flagged the importance of being ‘realistic about
what the programme has or might have achieved’
(DSD, 2011: 3). The report concluded with a
number of key findings which included:
•While there has been some narrowing of the
gap between the neighbourhood renewal areas
and the rest of Northern Ireland on a range of
outcome indicators, the areas remain some
way behind in both relative and absolute
terms.
•The Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy has laid
the foundations necessary for future action.
•Given the scale of the problems still remaining
in the most deprived areas, the regeneration
programmes will not be enough on their own
to achieve significant change (DSD, 2011, pp.
6–7).
The tone and substance of these conclusions
suggest that the internal (DSD) evaluators were
dampening expectations of narrowing the gap
between NRAs and non-NRAs. The internal
evaluators expressed concerns about their ‘ability
to assess the impact of the programme’. More
specifically they argued: ‘there is generally a lack
of solid evidence of the overall impact of
geographically targeted programmes on multiple
deprivation’ (DSD, 2011, p. 138). It proved
impossible to secure cross-departmental buy-in
to a policy which requires not only a commitment
across government but also a sustained
relationship with the voluntary and community
sectors.
Tackling wicked problems: multi-
generational poverty
With the experience of the Neighbourhood
Renewal Programme in the background, the
devolved government has been hugely conscious
of the most pervasive wicked issue in Northern
Ireland, multi-generational poverty and social
exclusion. As the manifestations of the conflict
reduce, there is also a need for people on the
ground to see the benefits of peace, particularly
in areas most affected by the terrorism. Persistent
and multi-faceted deprivation has a negative
impact on a whole range of outcomes, including
education, health, wellbeing and economic
activity, and must therefore be a priority issue for
any government. Addressing these problems
requires a combination of flexible and tailored
measures to help people find their way out of
poverty. This demands a scale of response which
can break the vicious cycle of poverty manifest in
poor education and health outcomes, low levels
of economic activity, and, in turn, poor life
opportunities for the next generation.
Poverty levels in Northern Ireland have
remained stubbornly high. The trend in relative
poverty* has changed little over a 10-year period
increasing from 21% in 2002/03 to 23% in 2011/
12. The latter accounts for about 406,000 people
(from a population of approximately 1.8 million).
The impact of poverty on children and young
people is of particular concern, given the effects
of deprivation on child development and
therefore life opportunities (Allen and Duncan
Smith, 2009). The percentage of children in
relative poverty after housing costs was 27% in
2011/12, which is 3% higher than in 2010/11.
This equates to over 119,000 children
(Department of Social Development, 2013).
Delivering Social Change (DSC)
In light of these high levels of poverty and failure
in tackling wicked issues, the Northern Ireland
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Executive is trying to find new joined-up ways to
address the root causes of poverty through a new
initiative entitled, Delivering Social Change
(DSC). The aims of DSC are to:
•Deliver a sustained reduction in poverty and
associated issues across all ages; improve
children and young people’s health, wellbeing
and life opportunities.
•Break the long-term cycle of multi-generational
problems (OFMDFM, 2012)
At its launch in March 2012, the first minister
made reference to the framework as follows:
We are determined to work together across
government to make a real impact on the divisions
that have blighted our community. That is why we
have developed the Delivering Social Change
delivery framework. The reality is that we cannot
continue to address the so-called intractable problems
of poverty and social inclusion using the methods
employed in the past. We have too many strategies,
too many policies and too many action plans, many
of which refer to work already proposed or under
way and do not add real value (Robinson, 2012).
The deputy first minister endorsed these
comments and added ‘it is our clear intention to
develop a single, coherent action plan that will
address the needs of children and young people,
tackle multigenerational poverty and improve
people’s life opportunities’ (McGuinness, 2012
reference?). These statements set out very clearly
the intention of a new cross-departmental
approach in implementing public policies to
tackle poverty and social exclusion. DSC has
been framed in order to focus attention on the
root causes of poverty and to provide a rationale
for intervening early in the life-cycle to end the
cycle of multi-generational poverty.
Signature programmes
Having committed to early action, in October
2012 the first minister and deputy first minister
launched six major signature programmes at a
total value of £26 million. (To put this in context,
Northern Ireland spent £968 million on personal
social services in 2011/12.) The rationale for the
programmes included: early interventions and
early years programmes; measures to improve
literacy and numeracy; services to support
transitions from one stage of life to another (for
example leaving home, family breakdown or
illness: integrated delivery of public services
within communities); and, joined-up planning
and commissioning arrangements to prepare
the way for future community planning
proposals, an integral aspect of the reform of
local government due in 2015.
The signature programmes were developed
through rapid, intensive planning by ministerial
special advisers, informed by research and good
practice materials supplied by officials. The
overarching aim was to provide momentum,
secure some early wins for the new approach and
demonstrate the ability of intensive, collaborative,
cross-departmental working to produce better
results in tackling poverty. There were three key
considerations in the development of the
programmes. First, the aim was to enhance
mainstream services, providing additionality and
acting as a catalyst for the reform of existing
services. While £26 million is a very significant
budget, it is eclipsed by the scale of the needs and
therefore requires influencing the development
of mainstream services. The second consideration
was to stimulate a response which can make a
difference at population level. While the aim was
to incorporate recent innovations in the
programmes (for example family resource hubs
and nurture units had been piloted), the intention
was not to run a series of small scale pilots.
*Absolute poverty: An individual is considered to be in
absolute poverty if they are living in a household
with an equivalized income below 60% of the (inflation
adjusted) median income in 2010/11. This is a
measure of whether those in the lowest income
households are seeing their incomes rise in real
terms.
Relative poverty: An individual is considered to
be in relative poverty if they are living in a household
with an equivalized income below 60% of UK median
income in the year in question. This is a measure of
whether those in the lowest income households are
keeping pace with the growth of incomes in the
population as a whole.
Figure 2. Relative income poverty
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Rather, it was to establish additional interventions
at NI wide scale. Finally, the plan was to intervene
early in the life-cycle, and at a family level, to
provide a basis for improved long-term outcomes.
While the approach in developing this
programme was considered to be innovative,
there is a significant body of practical evidence to
support the different constituent parts, namely:
for enhanced parenting programmes (NHS,
2013; Incredible Years, 2013, Nurture Group
Network, 2013); for tailored support to assist
children who are struggling at school (Ofsted,
2011); and for the benefits of social enterprise
(EC, 2013). In addition, major partnerships of
stakeholders have identified the need for joined-
up services through the family resource hubs.
The signature programmes included the
following:
•Education: employment of 150 recently
graduated teachers, without permanent
employment, on two-year contracts to deliver
one-to-one tuition in English and maths to
year 11 and 12 post-primary school pupils
who are not projected to get a ‘C’ grade in
English and/or maths. Employment of 80
recently graduated teachers, without
permanent employment, on two-year
contracts to deliver one-to-one tuition to
primary school pupils who are struggling
with reading and maths at key stage 2. The
establishment of 20 new children’s ‘nurture
units’ to improve the lives and educational
attainment of children by offering support,
help and guidance to targeted pupils within
the school environment.
•Health and social care: additional funding for
parenting programmes including additional
health workers to support new parents. The
programme will provide support for up to
1,200 parents living in areas of deprivation
and will potentially employ up to 50 additional
health workers. The establishment of 10 family
support hubs to provide co-ordinated early
intervention services in local areas to provide
a range of holistic family support services.
•Enterprise and employment: a pilot intervention to
support young people, not in education,
employment or training (NEETs), which will
be rolled out to 700 families through the
Department of Employment and Learning.
The creation of 10 social enterprise incubation
hubs to encourage business start-ups in empty
or derelict clusters of units and shops to reduce
unemployment in local areas of deprivation
(OFMDFM, 2012).
All of these programmes are being implemented.
The first and deputy first ministers intend to
consolidate available Executive funds into a £118
million budget which will support the
implementation of DSC. Several key planned
initiatives were incorporated under the DSC
rubric. These include a framework and
supporting research to tackle multi-generational
poverty and social exclusion; an £80 million
social investment fund; compliance with the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities; and a childcare strategy
with key actions to provide integrated and
affordable childcare. In September 2013, the
Bright Start strategic childcare framework was
published which included a range of strategic
actions including the commissioning of up to
7,000 additional childcare places (OFMDFM,
2013a).
Plus ça change
So, will DSC result in a shift towards more
integrated public services capable to tackling
wicked issues? It differs from the traditional
approach where broadly based strategies are
developed followed by long lists of actions. The
framework was therefore designed to promote:
•More focused and effective working between
political leaders and senior officials (special
political advisers, ministers and civil servants)
across departments through the delivery of
signature programmes to achieve early results
but, in the longer term, can effect system-wide
policy change.
•Greater flexibility in the use of available
resources to fund those programmes which
are additional to existing services and which
can promote more joined-up working between
services in the community.
•A more positive and practical approach to
tackling poverty, both in the medium and in
the longer terms, and the removal of unhelpful
and essentially artificial divisions between areas
of policy which can obscure the root problems
(for example child poverty and family-level
poverty have similar root causes).
One of the earliest changes arising from the DSC
framework was to hard-wire political and
managerial inputs into new governance
structures. Typically cross-departmental
initiatives have been undertaken through groups
of officials from the various government
departments, either in the form of steering
groups, more formal programme boards or ad
hoc ‘champions’ groups. In some cases, such as
the Ministerial Group for Public Health or the
Cross-Departmental Group on Climate Change,
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these have been chaired by ministers but, for the
most part, the majority of their membership has
consisted of officials.
These groups have had varying levels of
success depending on the nature of the issues in
question and the people involved. However, in
many cases it has been difficult to maintain
adequate membership of these groups over
extended periods. This tends to be observed in
non-attendance by members of the group and/
or substitute members attending on behalf of
permanent members. This leads to a situation
where those in attendance do not feel empowered
to provide commitments on behalf of their
respective departments.
The governance structures for DSC (see
figure 3) aimed to tackle these issues in a number
of ways:
•A single set of governance structures with
Ministerial Sub-Committees for Children and
Young People, and Poverty and Social
Inclusion, at the top. One outcome has been
a reduction in the number of papers issued to
ministers in order to encourage a more free-
flowing discussion around the issues.
•Personal leadership of the framework by the
junior ministers in the Office of the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister
(OFMDFM).
•An overarching Programme Board, chaired by
junior ministers, with membership drawn
exclusively from senior officials across all key
government departments.
•A mixture of political (special adviser) and
official (civil servant) membership on all of the
governance structures and programme boards
which collectively seek to manage the
programme of work.
•A single DSC Policy Board chaired by the civil
service ‘policy champion’ and permanent
secretary of the DSD.
The challenge, in progressing these initiatives,
will be to take DSC into the community, moving
away from an emphasis on projects and
programmes towards genuine, long-term
partnerships and reforms. In doing so, it needs
to align with other major cross-governmental
initiatives, such as the Together: Building a United
Community which is focused on developing good
relations across Northern Ireland (OFMDFM,
2013b).
Conclusions
The difference between tackling fragmented
government in Northern Ireland compared to
the rest of the UK is that there is a confluence of
political and public administration interests.
Politicians and civil servants, with advice from
community stakeholders, have co-designed the
policy interventions. Davies (2009, p. 94), for
example, argues that approaches to joined-up
government in Great Britain have tended to
emphasise the technical and managerial
dimensions of the challenge when, in fact, if
joining-up is to occur ‘the political challenge
must be acknowledged openly and hard-wired
into the institutional mechanism and cultural
practices designed to bring it about’. He suggests
‘the challenge of policy co-ordination is not
solvable by eschewing politics for technocratic
managerialism. On the contrary, joined-up
politics is a prerequisite for effective managerial
co-ordination’. Notwithstanding the significant
ideological differences between the DUP and
Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, DSC has witnessed
engagement with those differences and political
endorsement of managerial actions in the
implementation of a widespread programme of
cross-departmental change. To use Davies’
description: ‘politics are hard-wired into the
process’ at both design and implementation stages
in the form of the governance arrangements
now in place.
There are, of course, lessons to be learned
from elsewhere. Exworthy and Hunter’s (2011,
p. 210) research on the contribution which joined-
up government made to tackling health
inequalities in England, or narrowing the health
gap between different social groups, was
described as ‘relatively modest’. In part, they
attribute this to the prevailing performance
culture in which targets ‘invariably isolate the
performance of individual organizations’. But
they also generalize about the experience of
Figure 3. Governance structure: Delivering Social Change (DSC).
Ministerial Sub-Committee on Poverty and Social
Exclusion (and Children and Young People)
Delivering Social Change (DSC) Programme Board
chaired by junior ministers
European Centre Programme
Board
DSC Policy Project Board
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joined-up government, suggesting that it is a
perfect example of ‘path dependency’ where it
is exceedingly difficult to tackle organizational
inertia ‘resulting from a combination of previous
decisions and existing institutions dominated
by structural forces and vested interests’
(Exworthy and Hunter, 2011). Research by
Perri 6 (2004, p. 125) also highlights the
distinction between managerial/political co-
ordination at the centre and its limitations in
tackling a lack of co-ordination and integration
in the field. Central prescription ‘can do little
more than encourage an enable’ an integrated
approach in the face of strong bottom-up
processes.
O’Flynn et al.’s research on joined-up
government in Australia is also instructive for
Northern Ireland in that they identify inhibitors
or common factors which frustrate joined-up
approaches as: the lack of a supporting
architecture; a programmatic focus and
centralized decision-making. They describe the
need to support integrated services in a way
which ‘resets incentives, provides authority,
builds long-term trusting-based relationships,
and recognizes and rewards cooperative
behaviors’ (O’Flynn et al., 2011, p. 248). They
also identify tensions between vertical and
horizontal relationships and over-centralization
of decision-making. The lessons for Northern
Ireland are useful here. While the over-arching
DSC governance arrangements offer
‘supportive architecture’ and the political
imprimatur to make significant change happen,
there also needs to be sufficient decentralized
decision-making to react to on-the-ground
circumstances. Tensions may well arise over
the lines of accountability. Senior departmental
officials still have accountability upwards to
their line-ministers and the Northern Ireland
Assembly—joined-up government requires
horizontal accountability to the DSC
programme. In other words, DSC governance
structures demand cross-departmental lines of
accountability to tackle wicked issues which, in
turn, intersect with officials’ vertical
departmental accountability to the minister
responsible.
Delivering Social Change is Northern
Ireland’s adaptation of joined-up government
in a very different set of political arrangements.
The power-sharing devolved government has
come late to the whole business of reforming
public services because of its focus on resolving
wider constitutional and security issues. These
political arrangements have also presented
more acute problems for integrated services
delivery but, in so doing, have offered a real
opportunity for collaborative working between
politicians, civil servants and local communities.
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